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Sensemaking and the distortion of critical upward communication in organisations 
 
Abstract 
Most research into feedback has focused on communication from managers to non-
managerial staff. To a lesser extent, it has more recently addressed upward and 360 
degree appraisal systems. In contrast, the role of informal upward communication 
continues to be largely neglected, especially when it concerns the transmission of 
opinions critical of managerial orthodoxy. There has been little examination of the 
sensemaking heuristics employed by both managers and non-managerial staff that 
stimulates the former to disregard much of the already muted critical upward 
communication they receive, and the latter to suppress its transmission in the first 
place. We therefore suggest that managers often over commit to particular courses of 
action, irrespective of whether they bode ill or well for the organization concerned. In 
so doing, they frequently demonise those who belong to stigmatised outgroups or who 
hold contrary value systems. We argue that the consequent elimination of critical 
upward communication (henceforth, CUC) leads to iatrogenic phenomena – i.e. 
organizational problems that are derived from the treatment regime that has been 
prescribed, rather than from a pre-existing condition.  Implications for practice and 
further research are considered. 
KEYWORDS 
Critical upward communication; iatrogenic organisational interventions 
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INTRODUCTION: UPWARD FEEDBACK IN CONTEXT 
 
Feedback can be defined as, ‘messages conveyed to a receiver about his, her, or its 
(group) performance’ (Cusella, 1987, p.626). It is an intrinsic aspect of 
communication processes, and hence is thoroughly integrated into the fabric of 
organizational life. Feedback may be positive, neutral or critical in nature. This paper 
is principally concerned with feedback that is critical of organizational goals and 
management behaviour (i.e. critical upward communication, henceforth CUC), and 
which is transmitted by those without managerial power to those with such power. 
Our argument is that, consistent with a tendency to overlook power imbalances and/ 
or underestimate their effects, managers often resort to behaviours which, 
intentionally or otherwise, discourage the transmission of CUC. These processes have 
been under-researched. In particular, previous research has had relatively little to say 
about how organizational actors themselves understand these processes. Perspectives 
drawn from sensemaking can usefully supplement previous research, which suggests 
that managers deprived of sufficient CUC develop inaccurate perceptions of the 
communication climate within their organizations.  
 
Most previous research has tended to visualise influence as flowing from managers to 
subordinates, rather than the other way round (Tourish and Pinnington, 2002). Where 
research into upward communication has occurred, it has tended to reflect this 
orientation. An earlier and influential review of the literature in the area noted that, 
‘communication upward from subordinate to superior is reported to take four primary 
forms: (a) information about the subordinate himself/ herself, (b) information about 
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co-workers and their problems, (c) information about organizational practices and 
policies, and (d) information about what needs to be done and how it can be done’ 
(Jablin, 1979, p.1202). This suggests that, although information about organizational 
practices and policies is highlighted, upward communication is rarely conceived of 
specifically in terms of the transmission of information that is openly critical of 
declared organizational priorities. It tends to be explored from the perspective of 
feedback that deals with job performance, or neutral information about organizational 
performance that can enhance the implementation of a predetermined management 
agenda. 
 
Thus, little of the research into upward communication/ feedback that has taken place 
in recent years has flowed from a concern with CUC. Most of the research has been 
spurred by the growing popularity of upward appraisal systems in organizations (e.g. 
DeNisi, 1996; Atwater et al., 2000; Hargie et al., 2004). The bulk of this work 
suggests that, in the contemporary organization, upward feedback itself seems to most 
often occur as part of the formal appraisal process, rather than informally and through 
the communication channels used on a daily basis (Atwater et al., 1995). In terms of 
upward feedback, the research has tended to be quantitative in nature, and driven by 
an imperative to explore what makes appraisal systems more effective, in the sense of 
improving organizational effectiveness from a management perspective.  
 
Thus, empirical investigations have sought to establish that upward feedback, upward 
communication and open door policies deliver significant organizational benefits (e.g. 
Hegarty, 1974; London and Wohlers, 1991; Moravec et al., 1993; Reilly et al., 1996). 
However, significant problems have also been reported with the delivery of feedback. 
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In an everyday occurrence, ‘…people often have to make decisions about whether to 
speak up or remain silent’ (Morrison and Milliken, 2003, p.1353). Articulating a voice 
in the workplace has been variously conceptualised as employee voice, issue selling, 
whistle-blowing, championing, dissent and boat rocking (Dutton and Ashford, 1993; 
Miceli and Near, 1992; Parker, 1993; Saunders et al, 1992; Kassing, 2001; Withey 
and Cooper, 1989).  However, many people decide not to provide feedback in any 
form. 85% of respondents in one survey indicated that that on at least one occasion, 
‘they had felt unable to raise an issue or concern to their bosses even though they felt 
that the issue was important’ (Milliken et al., 2003, p. 1459). More fundamentally, 
feedback tends to mainly flow from persons in authority to their subordinates, rather 
than the other way round (Luthans and Larsen, 1986). Despite the fact that 
communication is a central theme in the leadership literature, it is conceived, ‘almost 
exclusively in terms of managers doing the talking. With few exceptions, listening is 
not addressed in the literature’ (Alvesson and Sveningsson, 2003, p. 1439). Moreover, 
where upward feedback occurs it tends to be more positive than critical in nature 
(Baron, 1996). We are therefore left with a paradox. On the one hand, it is 
increasingly recognised that organizations now suffer from information overload, 
sometimes termed infoglut or data smog (Edmunds and Morris, 2000). On the other 
hand, motivating truthful upward communication, and so ensuring more of it, is 
widely recognised as a serious problem (Chow et al., 2000). 
 
Overall, relatively little research into feedback has been performed by organizational 
communication scholars (Cusella, 1987). A gap in the literature therefore exists. This 
paper seeks to outline a research agenda from a communications perspective, and one 
that is essentially interpretive and critical in nature. The absence of systems designed 
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to institutionalise CUC into the management decision making process is often 
rationalised by the assumption on the part of managers that most members of an 
organization should share a common set of values, have the same appreciation of 
events, display a common commitment to managerial goals, and accept that managers 
are the people most capable of accurately understanding the organization’s external 
and internal environments. We argue that none of these assumptions can be sustained. 
Rather, we suggest that sensemaking perspectives can illuminate more precisely the 
role of supportive or dissenting voice in upward communication. 
 
Figure 1 illustrates how the argument is developed in this paper. It suggests that 
employees broadly face a choice of articulating a supportive or a dissenting voice to 
managers.  Supportive voice, to which low risks but high rewards are attached, 
generates a strong flow of communication to managers. It is in turn reinforced, 
encouraged and rewarded.  Such a scenario helps produce managerial perceptions of 
organisational climate at odds with those of other key organisational actors. 
Mismatched perceptions therefore have iatrogenic consequences – i.e. problems arise 
that are caused by the treatment regime prescribed by managers, and which flow from 
misdiagnosis, rather than from a pre-existing condition. On the other hand, where 
employees choose to articulate dissent, they tend to do so mildly, since dissent carries 
high risks and attracts low rewards. Dissent is therefore expressed in a weak flow of 
communication to management. But even this can elicit a strong flow of 
communication from managers to the dissenters, in the form of messages and actions 
which penalise dissent.  Alternatively, with a dissenting voice, employees may elect 
to remain completely silent.  However, both dissenting voice scenarios produce the 
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same iatrogenic organizational interventions that result from the ingratiating 
communication witnessed when a voice supportive of managers is articulated.  
 
Insert Figure 1 
 
We begin a detailed discussion of these issues by further exploring the role of dissent 
in organisations, how it is demonised or penalised, and the contribution which such 
processes have been found to make to organisational outcomes. 
 
FEEDBACK, THE DEMONISATION OF DISSENT AND 
ORGANIZATIONAL OUTCOMES 
 
The absence of CUC contributes to the development of different mindsets and 
perceptions on the part of employees and managers, on such issues as the nature of the 
organization’s communication climate and the supportiveness of communication 
received from and transmitted to managers. In turn, such dichotomous approaches are 
linked to the emergence of major organizational problems. This becomes clear when 
we consider the relationship between organizational failure, on the one hand, and the 
feedback available or unavailable to those at the top on the other. A number of studies 
have been conducted into organizations facing serious crisis or failure (e.g. Starbuck 
et al, 1978; Starbuck, 1983; Sull, 2003). In general, it has been found that senior 
managers often have views of their firms and their market environments that differ 
greatly from what outsiders consider to be realistic. Other studies have found that the 
perceptions of senior managers may differ markedly from those of their more junior 
colleagues, with those at the top typically seeing fewer and milder deficiencies in their 
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organizations (Payne and Pugh, 1976; Mezias et al., 2001; Mezias and Starbuck, 
2003).  
 
The absence of CUC has therefore been increasingly identified as a causal factor in 
organizational problems. Seeger and Ulmer (2003) argued that the collapse of Enron 
was partially caused by a failure on the part of its senior managers to maintain 
adequate communication systems capable of transmitting information about 
organizational problems. There is ample testimony from former employees that the 
organisation promoted an internal culture of ‘no bad news’ (e.g. Cruver, 2003; Swartz 
and Watkins, 2003) and that it used a punitive system of internal appraisal, known as 
‘rank and yank’ to penalise those seen to be dissenters (Tourish, 2005). For example, 
when one internal critic drew her concerns to Chairman Kenneth Lay’s attention, his 
first response was to seek legal advice about the possibility of securing her dismissal 
(Watkins, 2003). The paradox is that managers have often declared a preference for 
empowerment, involvement and open communication. However, employees still, ‘feel 
that speaking up about issues and problems is futile, or, worse yet, dangerous’ 
(Milliken and Morrison, 2000, p.721). Thus, top managers in crisis ridden 
organizations have been observed to frequently receive accurate warnings and 
diagnoses from some subordinates, but to then pay them little or no attention 
(Harrison, 1991). In a study of 20 firms facing crisis, Dunbar and Goldberg (1978) 
found that many top managers surrounded themselves with yes-sayers. Such people 
screened those at the top from signs of trouble and diluted warnings from middle 
managers when they attempted to report problems. The consequence is that when 
managers do not notice, or they ignore, suppress or even scorn warning signals from 
their internal or external environments they end up insouciantly ‘driving through a red 
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light’ (Wissema, 2002, p.522). This might be described as a crisis of over-optimism, a 
frequent precursor of business disaster.  
 
Thus, top management openness encourages further expressions of voice (Premeaux 
and Bedeian, 2003). However, in contravention of this, managers often create systems 
which ensure that only a certain kind of information is brought to their attention. 
What they then attend to is filtered through their cognitive biases and values 
(Hambrick and Mason, 1990), producing a distorted grasp of reality, and managerial 
decisions which are inappropriate or harmful. It is our contention that management 
interventions framed in the absence of CUC are especially prone to such problems. 
Moreover, they may lead to interventions that are almost invariably well intentioned, 
but that produce unexpected negative consequences due to the flawed perception of 
the internal and external environment from which they have sprung. Researchers have 
therefore argued that organizations should encourage the presence of ‘contrathinkers’, 
keen to take on a devil’s advocate position and criticise prevailing managerial 
orthodoxy (e.g. Wissema, 2003).  
 
On first inspection, this sounds a straightforward proposition. The problem is that 
when people have radically different perceptions of what constitutes reality they are 
also inclined to think that their perception of it is more widely shared than it is. Given 
this, a key argument in this paper is that they are unaware that they discourage the 
expression of critical opinion. People are especially sensitive to negative input – what 
has been termed the automatic vigilance effect (Pratto and John, 1991). This reflexive 
action is consistent with threat-rigidity theory, which postulates that, ‘a threat to the 
vital interests of an entity... will lead to forms of rigidity’ (Staw et al., 1981, p.502). 
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One of our most fundamental needs, in most relational contexts, is to present a 
positive face to others, and to be reassured that the positive light in which we see 
ourselves is widely shared (Hargie and Tourish, 1997). Critical feedback may appear 
to threaten face needs, and hence be perceived as an attack on vital interests. Thus, 
when managers are faced with CUC, they are more likely to retreat into well worn 
patterns of behaviour than they are to stay open to new ideas or encourage challenges 
to existing practices. It is therefore likely that their less than enthusiastic, or outrightly 
punitive, response to critical feedback will discourage members of the organization 
from offering more of it Moreover, rigidity effects are reinforced by information 
insufficiencies, and a desire to avoid blame and confusion (Barnett and Pratt, 2000). 
Accordingly, the retreat into rigidity further curtails the flow of CUC, reinforcing the 
original problem. 
 
The implications for organizational functioning are profound. The absence of CUC 
reinforces the view of those at the top that their opinions are more widely shared and 
accepted than they are. What has been variously defined as the principle of social 
proof (Cialdini, 2001) or consensual validation (Zebrowitz, 1990) is then likely to 
come into play, in which the assumption people hold that their views are more widely 
shared than they really are encourages the parallel fallacy that they must be correct. 
With such a conviction in place, it is yet more likely that dissent will be viewed as 
resistance to be overcome rather than useful feedback (Lewis, 1992). The conviction 
takes root that there is one truth which explains most of the organization’s problems, 
that a few key people (i.e. its Senior Management Team) have a particularly deep 
understanding of this truth, that those who dissent are either misinformed or do not 
have the welfare of the organization at the forefront of their minds, and that such 
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dissenters need to be silenced and conquered rather than persuaded (Tourish, 1998). 
The implied unitarist view of organizations challenges the notion that they can best be 
viewed as coalitions, in which, ‘there is no requirement for the participants to share 
vested interests or singular, paramount goals’ (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003, p.26). 
Clearly, a ‘coalitionist’ perspective is more likely to favour multiple viewpoints, open 
communication systems, and hence CUC. A unitarist view is more likely to stress 
homogeneity, conformity and downward communication rather than CUC. 
 
The conviction that there is an abundant understanding for the ideas of senior 
managers, combined with the manner in which the automatic vigilance effect and 
threat rigidity effects discourages genuinely open communication, is then expressed in 
narratives that demonise whatever critical opinions that do surface. Accordingly, the 
managerial mindset that results from the discouragement of CUC is often 
characterised by an ideological commitment to particular courses of action, 
irrespective of whether they bode ill or well for the organization concerned, and a 
tendency to demonise those who belong to stigmatised outgroups or who hold 
contrary value systems (Tourish, 2000). Theories of feedback must take into account 
the fact that different individuals and groups in any organization will have conflicting 
perspectives on what is important, what is happening and the contribution that each 
makes to the organization’s goals. Sensemaking perspectives thus have much to offer, 
and indeed have been increasingly popular in organization studies (e.g. Patriotta, 
2003; Tomlinson and Egan, 2003). 
 
SENSEMAKING PERSPECTIVES ON CRITICAL FEEDBACK 
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Even when people are confronted by straightforward data, dealing with seemingly 
verifiable empirical facts, they often form impressions that are either inaccurate, or 
which differ (sometimes dramatically) from those of fellow observers. Perception is, 
‘shaped by the needs and prior beliefs of the perceiver, rather than the ‘objective 
facts’ presented’ (Winter, 2003, p.40). Despite this, most of us trust our memory 
implicitly, believe that our sense of recall is more accurate than that of most other 
people, and prefer to rely on the stories that we construct to depict our sense of reality, 
rather than statistical evidence or the impartial counsel of other observers (Dawes, 
1994).   
 
The problem of contested perceptions of reality becomes ever more apparent when we 
consider human communication. Interaction is inherently subtle, shaded, and 
ambiguous in both form and content (Hargie and Dickson, 2004). It can be argued 
that, despite their best efforts, managers therefore struggle to grasp how other people 
view the organization concerned, the role of the managers within it, and the efficacy 
of its communication systems. Given this, they therefore fall back on their naïve, 
interpretive constructions of the social world – constructions that are founded on both 
distorted feedback from others, and inherently deficient powers of recall. 
 
Thus, organizations can be viewed as, ‘collections of people trying to make sense of 
what is happening around them’ (Weick, 2001, p.5). It follows that equivocation, and 
hence conflicted understandings of how others behave, is central to organizational 
life. These efforts at sensemaking are expressed in stories, shaped either as interior 
monologues or exchanged with others, and hence refined through a process of 
collective dialogue. Narratives are ways of talking about organizations and hence they 
 13
depict perceptions that different people and groups have of organizing (Weick, 1979). 
Indeed, narratives and storytelling have been regarded as the basic organizing 
principle of human cognition (Boland and Tenkasi, 1995). Cognitively, they help us 
to simplify the world by providing some set of understanding that guides action, and 
which help us to monitor our behaviour as we do so (Weick, 1995). In particular, they 
can be viewed as, ‘emotionally and symbolically charged narratives. They do not 
present information or facts about ‘events’, but they enrich, enhance, and infuse facts 
with meaning’ (Gabriel, 2000, p.135).  
 
Accordingly, interpretation is central to sense making. The interpretive approach to 
organization studies assumes that we must consider the meanings which people attach 
to varied social situations  (Hatch and Yanow, 2003,). It is impossible to assume that 
individual members of groups or whole organizational systems embrace a unitaristic 
perspective, or share a common grasp of reality, and to suggest that one group’s 
understanding of that reality should be privileged above that of another. Thus, 
interpretivist perspectives in organizational communication research explore the 
communication processes whereby these rival cognitive sets are developed, shared 
with others, and reinforced as a result of such sharing. Stories are therefore 
constructed and told both as a means of trying to control the behaviour of others, and 
also as a means of resisting the attempts by others to control the behaviour of those 
telling the stories (Gabriel, 2000). The problem is that disparate groups often 
construct such stories in isolation from each other, and hence with a propensity to 
build rival narrative systems that diffuse a common sense of organisational purpose. 
In particular, it is likely that without systems in place that institutionalise CUC, the 
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stories which guide the behaviour and strategies of senior management teams will 
increasingly diverge from those constructed by non-managerial employees. 
 
Such conceptions have been downplayed in most research into feedback processes. 
Research into communication within organisations generally has been concerned with 
the mechanics of feedback systems, the ‘accuracy’ or otherwise of the feedback 
received by either managers or non-managerial staff, and the means by which the 
accuracy of such feedback can be improved (see Fletcher, 2001, for an overview). 
This neglect fails to recognise that feedback always reflects the deliverer’s and the 
receiver’s position in densely embedded social networks that condition his or her 
perception of reality. On many issues, particularly on the dynamics of interpersonal 
communication, there is no objective standard to which one can appeal in determining 
the accuracy of the feedback transmitted.  
 
In particular, people use social networks to reduce interpersonal uncertainty – what 
Granovetter (1978; 1985) has characterised as an ‘embedded’ view of behaviour, 
economic transactions, interpersonal perception and decision making. Granovetter’s 
(1985) concept of embeddedness endeavoured to find an intermediate course between 
what he referred to as ‘under-’ and ‘over-socialized’ views of social action. In relation 
to CUC, membership of such networks, and the amount of information available to 
them, helps shape people’s perception of the quality of communication they receive 
and transmit. Within this framework, it is important to recognise that  those who 
receive CUC perceive it as accurate or inaccurate based on their own position in the 
power saturated hierarchies in which they reside. In particular, self efficacy biases 
predispose us to believe that we personally are better on various positively rated 
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dimensions of social behaviour than most other people (Gioia, 1989; Pfeffer and 
Cialdini, 1998). Positive feedback therefore feels intuitively valid while critical 
feedback that conflicts with our idealised self image feels erroneous (Tourish and 
Hargie, 2004a). Accordingly, managers are inclined to view positive feedback 
favourably and critical feedback unfavourably, irrespective of any ‘objective’ merits 
that may be perceived by others. They also construct stories which claim that they 
make valiant efforts to promote CUC, only to be regularly thwarted by the unyielding 
and uninterested attitudes of others. Their embedded position in networks of other 
managers then ensures that such stories become common currency among groups of 
managers, and indeed often assume a canonical status in the folklore of such groups.  
 
This does not mean that organizations are wholly conflicted, or lacking in any unitary 
focus. For example, it may be possible for disparate organizational actors to agree on 
some principle or proposition, such as the primary mission of the organization or the 
need for and usefulness of CUC. But they may diverge about what these propositions 
mean in either theory or practice, about how they are being actualised in their own 
organization against some imaginary ideal, and about the respective commitments of 
managers and those that they manage to what is held up as ‘good process’. In 
addressing these issues, both managers and non-managers also construct sensemaking 
narratives that address questions of power – an issue of central relevance to the issue 
under discussion. 
 
SENSEMAKING AND POWER 
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Sensemaking perspectives are particularly appropriate when the issue of power is 
considered, as it must be when we address the question of CUC. Power exists as a key 
variable on both the surface and deeper structures of organization, while 
communication plays a vital role in how power relations are developed (Frost, 1987). 
However, power itself is a frequently unacknowledged variable in organizational 
science (Clegg, 2000). 
 
A corollary is that important issues involving information transmission from those 
without managerial power to those with such power have been insufficiently explored 
in the literature. Indeed, whatever other changes have occurred, ‘corporate 
organizations have remained largely autocratic in form’ (Deetz and Mumby, 1990, 
p.19). In such a context, it is unlikely that much emphasis will typically be placed on 
the necessity of senior managers securing CUC from ‘subordinates’ on their strategies 
and plans, as opposed to questions of operational implementation.  
 
It has been noted that one important manifestation of power is, ‘the capacity of an 
actor in that relationship to prevent the emergence of, for discussion and decision 
making, of anything other than “safe”, uncontroversial issues... Actors who have 
power in this sense are able, without protest from fellow actors, to leave contentious 
items off the agenda of decision-making meetings’ (Frost, 1987, p.506). Agenda 
setting is thus a useful index of power, and a commonly used tool when bringing 
about strategic change (Hardy, 1996). Sensemaking perspectives can help us to 
understand how both managers and non-managers interpret this process, so that one 
side has more ability than another to define the range of permissible topics for 
discussion, repress the transmission of CUC and so shape the wider organizational 
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agenda. Consistent with the terminology of Simon (1976), managers (as with all of 
us) tend to make decisions and adopt opinions based on limited information (i.e. they 
are ‘satisficing’), rather than by evaluating all available information. When they use 
their power to keep items off the agenda, and neglect to institutionalise CUC into the 
decision making process, they further constrain the amount of information that is 
available to them. As Mumby (2001, p.595) has noted, ‘[s]ensemaking is not simply 
the product of mutually shared assumptions and interpretive procedures, but rather is 
shaped by the political context in which it occurs.’ Organizational power is largely a 
matter of how individuals or groups shape dominant interpretations of what is 
occurring in the organization. When managers limit their own access to information, 
by constraining CUC, they reinforce their tendency to construct narrative accounts of 
organisational life that conflict with those of other actors. In turn, this has important 
implications for the wider organisational climate that is constructed. 
 
ORGANIZATIONAL CLIMATE, ‘SUPERIOR-SUBDORDINATE’ 
COMMUNICATION AND THE DISTORTION OF CUC 
 
Organizations with systems which constrain people’s opportunities to transmit CUC 
are likely to have a hierarchical, punitive and ultimately dysfunctional communication 
climate. Organizational climate consists of the values or characteristics of an 
organizational environment, and influences the behaviour of those within it (Tagiuri, 
1968). Within this, communication climate consists of such issues as supportiveness, 
participative decision making (or the lack of it), levels of trust, confidence and 
credibility, and levels of openness and candour (Redding, 1972). It is influenced by 
forces both external and internal to the organization (Falcione et al., 1987). The 
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question of openness between managers and non-managerial staff is pivotal to any 
consideration of organizational and communication climate. Such openness is 
generally conceptualised in terms of how open people are to both message sending 
and message receiving (Dansereau and Markham, 1987). However, it has long been 
recognised that employees are prone to distort the messages they transmit upwards, 
with deleterious effects on general climate issues and overall organizational 
functioning (Athanassiades, 1973). Consequently, managers and those they manage 
often have different perceptions on even such deceptively straightforward topics as 
subordinates’ basic job duties (Jablin, 1979) and whether and to what extent people 
are involved in decision making (Harrison, 1985). In particular, organizational silence 
has been viewed as ‘a collective phenomenon where employees withhold their 
opinions and concerns about potential organizational problems’ (Van Dyne et al., 
2003, p.1364). What has been considered less frequently are the sensemaking 
approaches managers and non-managed alike bring to bear on this issue, and by which 
they construct narratives to explain and justify their conceptions and misconceptions 
to themselves and each other. 
 
Moreover, the stories that emerge, from both senior managers and those who might be 
charged with providing feedback from other organizational levels, become key 
elements in the systems that encourage or discourage further efforts at CUC. We can 
illustrate the point by considering how punitively people may behave in the face of 
CUC, and the narrative consequences that flow from this. The choice to remain silent 
is often made because those managers ‘who do not wish to hear about problems can 
punish people for speaking up’ (Milliken and Morrison, 2003, p.1563).  And many 
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organizations do indeed send the message that those who express concerns will be 
severely punished (Perlow and Williams, 2003).  
 
However, non-managers also engage in sensemaking of a self serving nature. 
Researchers have found that the establishment of influence is one of the most 
powerful impulses that drive much upward communication (e.g. Kipnis and Schmidt, 
1988). In particular, those with lower status attempt to ingratiate themselves with 
those of a higher status by exaggerating how much they agree with their opinions, 
rather than by stressing areas of disagreement and contention (Jones, 1990; Rosenfeld 
et al., 1995; Kassing, 2001) – a form of influencing characterised in the literature as 
‘soft’ (Falbe and Yukl, 1992). Non-managers may be more or less open in their efforts 
to influence managers, and vary the extent to which they are open about their desired 
outcomes (Porter et al., 1981). It is unlikely that those involved fully acknowledge to 
themselves that they have embarked upon a self serving course of action. Self efficacy 
biases would lead us to expect that people wish to project a more idealised self image, 
in which they are willing to embrace the role of organizational dissenter and wish to 
speak up against what are perceived as the excesses of managerial power. Managers, 
meanwhile, do not wish to present themselves as autocrats who subvert discussion – 
despite the fact that assertiveness, rather than ingratiation, tends to be the single most 
commonly employed tactic when they attempt to influence subordinates (Kipnis et al., 
1980). Managers, therefore, speak of Herculean efforts at encouraging discussion and 
increased frustration at the unwillingness of people to do anything other than 
‘delegate decision making up’ (Tourish and Robson, 2003). It is a narrative of power 
refused, despite managers’ best efforts to nurture a hospitable communication climate. 
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Non-managers, on the other hand, tend to speak of heroic efforts at dissent, which 
perish beneath an artillery bombardment from managers.  
 
Thus, there is some empirical evidence to suggest that how top managers respond to 
CUC, and the stories that are communicated about it, helps to determine how much of 
it they will receive in the future. In particular, evidence suggests that top managers 
have a tendency to over-critique negative feedback, while instantly agreeing with 
positive feedback (Tourish and Robson, 2003). Moreover, the narratives that are 
constructed to explain this focus on the indeterminacy of the data (applying stringent 
criteria that are set aside when positive findings are at stake). This is often rationalised 
as a concern for the public image of the organization, depicted as vulnerable to the 
predatory attentions of a media pack obsessed by bad news stories. Negative results 
for the further transmission of CUC are likely to result. This analysis is consistent 
with the data on groupthink (Janis, 1972), which has long suggested that when group 
leaders over-critique dissent one of the key effects is that people tend to respond by 
concealing dissident opinions, fearful of a punitive response. The effect is 
compounded by our preference for group cohesion, ensuring that ‘members of a group 
may choose to not express dissenting opinions in the interests of maintaining 
consensus and cohesiveness in the group’ (Morrison and Milliken, 2003, p.1353). 
 
This analysis is also consistent with emerging data on company failure (e.g. 
Finkelstein, 2003), which documents a tendency on the part of top managers to ignore 
critical feedback, and indeed suppress its transmission. Tompkins (2005) documents 
repeated failures of this kind within NASA. He suggests that this helps explain many 
of its most high profile disasters, including the Columbia and Challenger catastrophes. 
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In a wider organisational context, the suggestion here is that most people at the 
receiving end of what they perceive as a hostile response to CUC tend to minimise 
further efforts at conveying what they really feel. The organizational climate becomes 
perceived as punitive. The effects are likely to go beyond the employee or employees 
most immediately affected. In line with consensual validation theory, people are more 
likely to speak up when they believe that they will obtain support from others (Bowen 
and Blackmon, 2003). The failure of co-workers to offer CUC discourages more and 
more people from also doing so. Senior managers, meanwhile, tend to imagine that in 
interrogating CUC they are merely applying rigorous standards to ambiguous data, 
and that its diminishing profile denotes higher levels of employee support for 
managerial initiatives than actually exists.  
 
Ultimately, it is senior managers who are most often charged with resolving these 
paradoxes. Their efforts to do so, clearly, are based on their own narrative constructs 
rather than those of anyone else – constructs which are, in the case of both managers 
and non-managers, self serving in nature. Given these disparities in perception, efforts 
at remedial action, however well intentioned, may have a counter-productive effect – 
a question which we now address. 
 
SELF-SERVING NARRATIVES, AND IATROGENIC MANAGEMENT 
INTERVENTIONS 
 
This paper has discussed narratives about the communication processes between 
managers and non-managerial staff, and which are deployed by both sides to shape 
their overall perception of each other. Their views of organizational life are determined 
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by the stories they construct, while this view reinforces the types of stories that they 
then tell, which in turn once more reinforces the apparent veracity of their sense of the 
world of work.  
 
Flowing from this, when managers respond to communication issues with narratives 
in mind that exaggerate how much CUC they receive, and which therefore signal an 
inaccurate impression of the communication climate within which they operate, they 
may create iatrogenic phenomena rather than solve problems – i.e. organizational 
maladies can result that are derived from the treatment regime that has been 
prescribed, rather than from a pre-existing condition. We suggest here that the notion 
of iatrogenic interventions and the implied analogy with medical interventions offers 
valuable insights into how CUC impacts on management behaviour, which in turn 
impacts positively or negatively on the wider body of the organization. The 
development of communication strategies, in particular, has been likened to a medical 
process, in which the condition of the organization is diagnosed, a treatment plan is 
prescribed and is then implemented (Hargie et al., 2002). Such plans are in the main 
devised by senior managers. Strategy will therefore reflect their intuitions, hunches 
and stories. Such narratives inevitably purport to describe cause and effect, accept or 
refuse responsibility and allocate blame. Blame avoidance ‘is a social fact of life’ 
(Bell and Tetlock, 1989, p.105), and strongly influences the behaviour of both 
managers and non-managers in most organisations. In this paper, we have highlighted 
how many managers over critique negative feedback, and through self serving 
attributions realign blame in such a manner that responsibility for poor internal 
communications is placed on the shoulders of others. In terms of the dynamics of 
CUC, action plans founded on a mis-reading of an organization’s mood, and without 
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sufficient awareness of the alternative stories constructed by others, are more likely to 
inflame such underlying problems as poor relationships, low levels of trust and 
ineffective communications than they are to cure them. 
 
In particular, such plans may stimulate a process of blame allocation, lead to the 
emergence of a (perceived) punitive internal culture, and see the intensification rather 
than the relinquishing of control. Each of these is likely to increase status differentials 
rather than diminish them. In turn, this will widen the gap in perception between 
managers and non-managers on such important questions as the communication 
climate they both inhabit. People may feel, even more intensely, that their concerns 
have been by-passed and that a wider gulf has emerged between themselves and 
managers. Further behaviours which minimise the transmission of CUC will result. 
Management interventions of this kind could therefore be described as iatrogenic – 
that is, managers are likely to preside over organizational problems that are to a large 
extent derived from the treatment regime they themselves have prescribed, and which 




From the overview presented in this paper, we would suggest that previous research in 
the field has been illuminating in many respects. For example, it is interesting and 
useful to know that managers who actively seek out critical feedback find that their 
stature is enhanced rather than diminished (Ashford and Tsui, 1991). But the ‘story’ 
does not end there. It is vital to understand the sense making processes whereby people 
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explain their communicative conduct, usually with a view to exonerating their own 
behaviour.  
 
In this spirit, we have argued that previous research into feedback processes has had 
relatively little to say about how organizational actors themselves understand these 
dynamics. It has also insufficiently explored how managers and non-managers justify 
the amount of CUC they transmit or receive. Ultimately, the narrative devices 
constructed by managers exaggerates how much CUC they receive and places the 
blame for the fact that more of it does not occur on non-managerial staff. Non-
managers, on the other hand, are prone to ingratiation behaviours, and seek to minimise 
their own responsibility for the transmission of information. Repeatedly, 
communication audits have found that although respondents typically report that they 
urgently want greater information, relatively few also say that they themselves should 
be sending more of it (Tourish and Hargie, 1998). Rather than admit all this to 
themselves, they therefore construct narratives which claim that senior managers have 
no interest in CUC, and that a terrifying fate awaits those who dissent. Such beliefs 
may frequently, and in some organizations, have a degree of objective truth. They may 
also represent a set of self serving rationalisations for ingratiating behaviour. The 
failure to offer feedback becomes a narrative of struggle against impossible odds and 
hence a rational choice, rather than an abdication of personal responsibility. However, a 
strong case can be made that it would be useful to institutionalise CUC more 
thoroughly into the fabric of organizational life. If this is to be done, the sensemaking 
heuristics employed by managers and non-managers to justify their present behaviours 
needs to be explored much more thoroughly than has been the case to date. 
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Thus, there are multiple implications for both practice and research: 
 
Implications for practice 
1. Organizations may find it useful to train people to seek out and respond 
constructively to CUC (Vatcha and Tourish, 2003). It does not appear to be a 
skill that is automatically acquired, or one that features in the course of most 
management training. 
2. Flowing from the above, managers also require training in ingratiation 
processes and how they might be overcome. It has been noted that even those 
exposed to information regarding ingratiation often assume, erroneously, that 
they themselves are immune to its effects (Tourish and Robson, 2003). They 
therefore fail to recognise its presence in their own lives, and, in a state of 
denial, avoid taking action to overcome it. Training on the issue would sensitise 
them to the various ways in which it is manifest. 
3. As part of acquiring heightened sensitivity to ingratiation issues, managers 
might also find it useful to routinely scrutinise positive upward communication 
with the same rigour that they bring to bear on CUC (Tourish, 2004). Jonathan 
Swift expressed it best: ‘The only benefit of flattery is that by hearing what we 
are not we may be instructed what we ought to be.’1  Management meetings 
could therefore find it beneficial to regularly focus on such questions as: 
• What problems have come to our attention recently? 
• What criticisms have we received about the decisions we are taking? 
• What is the ratio of positive to critical feedback that each of us has received 
recently? 
                                                 
1 Cited by De Vries (2001) op. cit.,  p.89 
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• Are the criticisms valid, partially or completely? What should we change in 
response to them? 
• How can we get more critical feedback into our decision-making processes? 
4. Greater experimentation with upward and 360 degree appraisal is also clearly 
warranted. Although, as we noted at the outset of this paper, many major 
organisations now routinely make use of both, others remain unaware of their 
benefits and resistant to their implementation.  
5. Methods should be developed to encourage much greater and more regular 
informal contact between managers and staff (Tourish and Hargie, 2004a). Such 
approaches are more likely to overcome some of the status differentials which 
inhibit CUC. 
 
Many of these pointers for practice are less than extraordinary, and may even run the 
risk of appearing mundane. However, there has been a tendency in the general 
leadership literature to ignore the more mundane aspects of managerial work and 
leadership (Alvesson and Sveningsson, 2003) – a neglect which we would suggest is 
unhelpful, and which partially explains the parlous level of practice to be found when it 
comes to institutionalising CUC into organizational systems.  
 
Research implications – towards an interpretivist agenda 
Significant research challenges can also be identified. In particular, we would suggest 
that a closer study of how managers respond to whatever CUC they receive, and how 
non-managers limit the amount they transmit, is warranted. In particular, we have 
suggested that the sense-making approaches of both managers and non-managers tend 
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to be self serving in nature, and are more likely to reinforce the status quo than 
stimulate change. Further research into such narratives and their impact is required.  
 
We also need to study more closely how participation in decision making affects the 
choice of influencing strategies that employees make, and how managers respond to 
them. For example, it has been found that failing to provide legitimate avenues for 
upward influence reduces CUC and limits the range of topics discussed in organizations 
(Krone, 1992). But providing supposedly legitimate outlets for CUC may not reduce 
such problems as the construction of disparate and antagonistic organizational stories, 
the use of ingratiation behaviours and hence the phenomenon of managers receiving 
predominantly over-positive upward communication. In particular, ingratiation 
behaviours may be endemic to any social situation in which even a modicum of status 
differentials and power imbalances are allowed to persist.  
 
Overall, this paper highlights a profound ambiguity within organizations on the issue of 
CUC. Decision making improves when it is present, and it is clearly a characteristic of 
more empowered and participative organizational environments. However, managers 
appear to be largely unaware of how little CUC they receive, or of how their own 
behaviour sometimes acts a barrier to its development. Employees, meanwhile, are 
prone to the constructions of narratives which minimise their own responsibilities on 
the issue. Substantial problems result. It is hoped that this paper stimulates further 
research into the narratives which underpin these polarities, and assists in the 
development of strategies which may overcome them.  
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Figure 1:  Supportive and dissenting voice in upward communication 
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